A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing by Friedman, E.J.
A Generic Analysis of Selﬁsh Routing
Eric J. Friedman¤
School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.
January 15, 2002
Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of selﬁsh routing in a congested network. This problem
is naturally motivated by the future development of the Internet as well as the behavior of
commonly used routing algorithms. Previous work has supplied a bicriterion bound on the
losses due to selﬁsh routing [RT00]. Our goal in this paper is to show how to extend this
analysis to bound the losses for “most” transmission rates. Formally, we show that for “most”
transmission rates the losses due to selﬁsh routing in networks are bounded by O(log(C)), where
C is a measure sensitivity of the network to changes in transmission rates. This contrasts with
the losses for the worst rate which can be linear in C. While the above results are for arbitrary
latency functions, we also show that these results are essentially unchanged by the restriction to
latency functions which naturally arise in data networks, such as the M/M/1 delay functions.
We also consider the current situation in which sources use congestion control algorithms. In
this case, we provide a tight bound which shows that congestion control dramatically reduces
the losses arising from selﬁsh routing.
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01 Introduction
The combination of ideas from game theory with those arising in computer science is becoming
increasingly important in analyses of many problems. (See, e.g., [Nis99, NR99, FPS00, Pap01,
AT01, JV01].) One of the main motivations for much of this work is the growth and privatization
of the Internet. Such analyses are crucial for the Internet’s continued operation as the cooperative
spirit of the Internet can not continue as it completes its transition from an academic to a business
environment. For example, why should an application use a congestion control protocol when its
own performance could be enhanced by disabling congestion control. (See e.g., [Nao69, San88,
She90, FS98]).
In this paper we focus on the speciﬁc problem of selﬁsh routing, in which agents get to choose
the path on which their traﬃc will travel. Motivated by this problem [KP99] studied a scheduling
model. They computed the losses due to selﬁsh routing, which they denoted the “price of anarchy.”
Recently, [MS01] and others have extended their results for related models of this type.
In [RT00], Roughgarden and Tardos introduced a much more realistic model of routing on the
Internet. Their model is similar to current proposals to give applications explicit control of the
routes they use [CCS95].
In that paper, [RT00], they explore the eﬃciency losses of selﬁsh routing. They show that the
loss from selﬁsh routing can be unbounded for general networks and latency functions. However,
they do construct bounds on the losses when the latency functions are polynomials with ﬁxed
degree. They also provide an intriguing bi-criteria result which shows (essentially) that the losses
due to selﬁsh routing can be completely compensated for by doubling the bandwidth on all links.
While these are powerful results, they are somewhat unsatisfying in relation to the Internet.
1First, most latency functions are not polynomial. In fact they typically diverge when the traﬃc
rate approaches the bandwidth. In this situation their analysis provides no bounds on the losses
due to selﬁsh routing. Second, it is diﬃcult to interpret the true meaning of the bi-criteria result.
Doubling bandwidth is typically not a reasonable option, in the short term, and even if one could
double the bandwidth then they would probably still wish to eliminate the possibly large losses due
to selﬁsh routing.
In this paper we extend Roughgarden and Tardos’ analysis in order to provide bounds which
alleviate these criticisms. Our approach is to analyze a generic version of the problem. While we
follow the standard practice of considering worst case in terms of the network latency functions
and topology (for which the notion of generic or typical is highly contentious [AH01]) we do not
require that the actual level of traﬃc be worst case and thus we consider the concept of generic
transmission rates. Given the variability of network traﬃc over time, this seems like a reasonable
concession for understanding the important issues involved with selﬁsh routing.
Unfortunately, as we show, even the generic behavior in this sense can be arbitrarily bad (al-
though the networks with this property seems quite artiﬁcial). However, if we condition our analysis
on the network’s “constant of criticality” which is deﬁned by the rate at which the Nash (selﬁsh)
equilibrium changes with a change in rates, then we can prove dramatically improved bounds which
arise from generic analysis. In particular, if we denote this constant of criticality by C then the
generic losses are bounded by O(log(C)) while the losses for speciﬁc rates can be linear in C, an ex-
ponential increase. This result holds for various deﬁnitions of genericity and criticality and appears
to be robust.
In addition, these results are essentially unchanged when we inject more reality into our model
by restricting to latency functions which naturally arise on networks, such as the delay for an
2M/M/1 queue.
We also consider one further property of the Internet for this model. Roughgarden and Tardos’
model assumes that agents have a ﬁxed transmission rate; however, on the Internet most ﬂows use
TCP for which the transmission rate is determined by the congestion on the network. Also, in the
near future, even UDP ﬂows will most likely provide congestion control under the “TCP-friendly”
protocol [FHP+00]. Thus, we consider a version of this model under which agents do not choose
a transmission rate, but instead open TCP-like connections. Interestingly, in this model the losses
due to selﬁsh routing are quite small. Thus, perhaps the losses due to selﬁsh routing on the Internet
might not be signiﬁcant.
Lastly, we note that routing is typically not under control of the applications. While there have
been proposals to allow versions of selﬁsh routing on the Internet [CCS95], the consensus seems
to be that selﬁsh routing is either impractical or undesirable. However, as we discuss more fully
below, this does not make it irrelevant. Standard routing protocols with recommended metrics
are actually iterative algorithms for ﬁnding the Nash equilibrium of the selﬁsh routing game. So
essentially our analysis is comparing the routing that arises on the Internet under the use of a
suboptimal, but commonly used metric, to that of the optimal metric, which is much more diﬃcult
to compute. Thus, models of selﬁsh routing might have direct implications for the current operation
of the Internet.
2 Model
We consider a general network. Let G = (V;E) be a graph with vertex set V , edge set E, and S a
set of source-destination vertex pairs. For each s 2 S let r(s) be the rate of ﬂow that is required to
ﬂow between the vertices in s and let Ps be the set of simple paths between them with P =
S
s Ps.
3Let xP ¸ 0 be the ﬂow on path P and let xe =
P
Pj e2P xP. A ﬂow x is feasible if
P
P2Ps xP = r(s)
for all s 2 S.
When xe is the total ﬂow on edge e, then the latency of that link is given by de(xe), where de(¢)
is a non-negative, continuous and nondecreasing function deﬁned on all of <+. The latency of a
path for a ﬂow x is given by dP(x) =
P
e2P de(xe).
The cost of a ﬂow x = fxeg is
P
e2E de(xe)xe. Then the cost of the (unique) optimal is ﬂow is
denoted Opt(r) and we let x¤(r) = denote the optimal ﬂow.
However, if users (each controlling an inﬁnitesimal amount of ﬂow) selﬁshly minimize their own
cost then we get the Nash equilibrium.1 Let ˆ x(r) denote the Nash equilibrium ﬂow and N(r) its
cost. It is straightforward to characterize this ﬂow. In the Nash equilibrium ﬂow we have that for
all s 2 S, P;P0 2 Ps such that dP(ˆ x(r)) > 0 then dP(ˆ x(r)) · dP0(ˆ x(r)). There is an analogous
characterization for the Optimal ﬂow.
We will be interested in the “loss” due to selﬁsh behavior, Γ(r) = N(r)=Opt(r). We will prove
generic bounds for this function over a set of values of r in terms of the degree of criticality of the
network over this interval C(r) = N(r)=N(r=2). Note, if we were only interested in a single value
of r then, by a theorem of Roughgarden and Tardos [RT00], N(r=2) · Opt(r) which is equivalent
to the statement Γ(r) · C(r) and it is easy to construct examples where this bound is tight. Thus,
the degree of criticality directly measures the potential worst case, non-generic, losses due to selﬁsh
routing.
Although our measure of criticality seems quite natural, C(r) = N(r)=N(r=2) there are other
natural measures, such as ˆ C(r) = Opt(r)=Opt(r=2). However, as we discuss later, diﬀerent choices
for the deﬁnition of criticality do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results.
1Formally, we are studying a non-atomic game. See e.g., [Sch73].
42.1 Selﬁsh Routing and Routing on the Internet
Note that for the standard routing protocols (which are allowed to split ﬂows) on the Internet
which compute shortest paths given some metric have the Nash equilibrium as the only stable
outcome when the metric used for a link is simply the latency2 de(xe) since the condition for
a Nash equilibrium is that all ﬂow is on links with minimal cost.3 Whereas, it is well known
that in order to compute the optimal routing these algorithms need to use the marginal cost of a
link, d(xede(xe))=dxe = de(xe) + xed0
e(xe) as the metric, which takes into account the interactions
between links.
However, one problem with implementing the metric for optimal routing is the numerical es-
timate of the derivative in an extremely noisy (bursty) system, while the selﬁsh outcome only
requires estimating the mean of the delay which is signiﬁcantly easier to estimate and more stable
in a dynamic sense. Thus, on these grounds one might prefer to use the suboptimal metric since,
as we show below, the losses due to selﬁsh routing might not be signiﬁcant.
3 Motivating Example
Roughgarden and Tardos consider a simple example of a parallel network with only two links. The
ﬁrst has constant latency d1(x1) = 1 while the second has latency d2(x2) = xk for some k > 0.
They show that Γ(1) ¼ k=ln(k) for k >> 1.
However, for r < 1, the results are less dire. In particular, when r < (k+1)¡1=k ¼ 1¡lnk=k the
Nash ﬂow is equal to the optimal ﬂow and thus Γ(r) = 1. Thus as k becomes large Γ(1) becomes
large but the set of ﬂows for which Γ(r) is small approaches the entire interval [0;1]. In this case,
2This metric is a said to be “common and useful” in a CISCO FAQ. See
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito doc/routing.htm
3However, one might expect convergence in this case to be problematic.
5the ﬂow with r = 1 is exceptional and for “most” values of r the loss due to selﬁsh routing is
extremely small. (Although the N(r) 6= Opt(r) for any r > 1, the region for which Γ(r) is large is
still quite small.)
4 An example with generically large losses
However, in contrast to the preceding example, we now show that generic losses can be arbitrarily
large. Speciﬁcally, we show that the losses due to selﬁsh routing can be large for over the entire
interval [r=2;r].
Consider a parallel network. Choose some integer n > 2 and deﬁne d0(x) = 1, dk(x) =
max[n¡k;1 + ²¡k(x ¡ (1=2)=n)] for 0 < k · n where ² << 1=n and dn+1(x) = 1 + ²¡n¡1(x ¡ 1=2).
By construction, N(1) = 1 where x0 = 0, xk = (1=2)=n for 1 · k · n, and xn+1 = 1=2 while the
optimal ﬂow occurs when dk(ˆ xk) = n¡k for k · n and dn+1(ˆ xn+1) = 0 where x0 = O(²), xk =
(1=2)=n+O(²k) for all 1 · k · n and xn+1 = 1=2+O(²n+1). Thus, Opt(1) < 1=(2n(n¡1))+O(²)
and therefore Γ(1) > 2n(n ¡ 1)) + O(²). Also, N(1=2) = n¡n + O(²) while Opt(1=2) = O(²), so
Γ(1=2) = Ω(1=²). Lastly consider the best case, when the ﬂow is the largest value of r such that
d1(ˆ x1(r)) = n¡1. In this case N(r) = n¡1+O(²), while Opt(r) < 1=(2n(n¡1))+O(²) and therefore
Γ(r) > 2(n ¡ 1) + O(²). In fact, for any r 2 [1=2;1], Γ(r) > 2(n ¡ 1) + O(²).
Using this construction we can show that given any ° > 0 and r0 > r > 0 there exists a network,
such that Γ(r) > ° for all r 2 [r;r0]. In particular, we can construct a network for which Γ(r0) ¸ °
for all r0 2 [r=2;r]. By combining multiple copies of this network we can extend this result to a
general network with any number of source/destination pairs.
However, for this network note that C(r) = N(r)=N(r=2) ¼ (°)° and thus the losses are
approximately logarithmic in C(r). This motivates the following analysis.
65 Results
Our results follow from the main result in [RT00].
Proposition 1 (Roughgarden and Tardos 2000) For all ± 2 (0;1] and r, N(r) · Opt(r(1 +
±))=±.
Our key tool will be a simple corollary of this proposition.
Corollary 1 For all ± 2 (0;1], if Γ(r) = ° then N(r=(1 + ±)) · N(r)°¡1=±.
Our results follow from this corollary, since, it implies that for any value of r such that the
losses from selﬁsh routing are large the value of the Nash equilibria must be falling rapidly. Thus
if there are a large set of points for which the losses from selﬁsh routing are large then the cost of
the Nash equilibrium must drop exponentially in the number of such points. A similar technique
was used by [You98] to show that for many caching algorithms “most” choices of cache sizes lead
to good performance.
As an immediate result we state the following, which shows that if Γ(r) is large for a large set
of ﬂows, then the cost of the Nash equilibrium must grow extremely rapidly.
Theorem 1 For any network, r > 0 and Γ(®r) > ° for all ® 2 [1=2;1], then logC(r) ¸
blog(2)=log(1 + e=°)c = °=e + O(1) and thus C(r) = exp[Ω(°)].
Proof: Suppose that for all r0 2 f®r j ® 2 [1=2;1]g, Γ(r0) > ° and let d = 1 + e=°. Then from the
above lemma we see that for any r0 2 f®r j ® 2 [1=2;1]g, N(r=d) · N(r)=e. Repeatedly applying
this inequality we get N(r=dj) · N(r)=ej as long as dj · e. Since N(r) is decreasing in r we get
N(r=e) · N(r)=eblog(2)=log(d)c. Plugging in the value for d yields the result. 2
The following corollary simply restates the above theorem.
7Corollary 2 For any network and r > 0, minfΓ(®r) j ® 2 [1=e;1]g = O(logC(r)).
We now prove our main result, that for most values of r, Γ(r) is bounded by the logarithm of
C.
Theorem 2 For any network, ° > 0 and r > 0, the set of rates with losses greater than °,
A° = f® 2 [1=2;1] j Γ(®r) ¸ °g has small Lebesgue measure,
logC(r) ¸ bº(A°)log(2)=log(1 + e=°)c
and thus
º(A°) = O(logC(r)=°);
where º(A°) is the measure of set A°.
Proof: For any set A° deﬁne the sequence f®jg1
j=0 by ®0 = supf ® 2 A°g and recursively ®j+1 =
supf® · ®j=d j ® 2 A°g if the sup exists and is 0 otherwise, where, as before, d = 1 + e=°. Now,
the sequence is deﬁned so that N(sj)=N(sj+1) ¸ e when sj+1 > 0 and thus log(C(r)) ¸ S(A°)
where S(A°) = maxfj j sj > 0g. We now show that the lowest bound on C(r) occurs when A° is an
interval of the form [v;1]. Assume that A° 6= [v;1] for some v 2 [1=2;1]. Let sj be as deﬁned above.
Assume that s0 = 1 if not then we can simply shift the entire set to the right and this can not
increase S(A°), since (sj;sj¡1=d]
T
A° = ;. Next assume that for all j · S(A°), sj = sj¡1=d, if not
we can shift the part of A° contained on [1=2;sj] to the right so that this holds without increasing
S(A°). Last, suppose that A° does not include all of [sj;1] when j = S(A°). Then we can simply
ﬁll it in using some of the measure from the left side of the set, which can not increase S(A°). Thus
we see that intervals of the form [v;1] give the strongest bound. (Note that the sets A° must be
ﬁnite collections of closed intervals, so all sets are measurable in the above construction.) 2
8Note that by using an extension of Roughgarden and Tardos’s theorem for parallel networks we
can improve the above results by a factor of about 3:2. This is discussed in the Section 7.
Recall, if we are only interested in a single value of r 2 [1=2;1] then the value of Γ(r) is only
bounded by C(r) in contrast to our bounds which depend on log(C(r)).
6 Other Deﬁnitions of Criticality and Genericity
Note that another natural measure of criticality would use the ratio ˆ C(r) = Opt(r)=Opt(r=2).
However, this would not signiﬁcantly alter our results since if Γ(r) = ° then since Opt(r=2) ·
N(r=2) we get ˆ C(r) ¸ (N(r)=°)=N(r=2) = C(r)=° so log( ˆ C(r)) ¸ log(C(r)) ¡ log(°). Since our
results show that ° = O(logC(r)) the second term would not be signiﬁcant.
Additionally, our analysis has studied the losses from selﬁsh routing along a very particular
geometric object: a portion of a ray, [r=2;r]. We now discuss generalizations to other geometric
objects.
Firstly, note that it is trivial to extend our analysis to intervals of diﬀerent lengths, such as
[½r;r] for any ½ 2 (0;1). For example in Theorem 1 would apply on this interval after replacing
log(2) with log(1=½).
Secondly, the use of rays from the origin is not crucial to our analysis. Roughgarden and
Tardos’s proof of Theorem 1 can be modiﬁed to show the following extension of that theorem.
Theorem 3 For all ± 2 (0;1], r ¸ 0 and any nonnegative vector v (of the same dimension as r)
such that jvj = jrj, N(r) · Opt(r + ±v)=±, where jxj =
P
k xk.
Note that when v = r this reduces to Roughgarden and Tardos’s theorem. Now if we deﬁne
C(r;v) = N(r)=N(r ¡v=2) as long as r ¡v=2 ¸ 0 then both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 generalize
in the natural way.
9Lastly, these results extend easily to higher dimensional sets of rates. For example, in a network
with j source/destination pairs, we could consider a generalized rectangle of rate pairs, such as
fr0 j rj=2 · r0
j · rj; 8jg. In general, let S be a set of the dimension of r and deﬁne the “size” of
S to be the smallest value of ½ such that there exists some r0 and v such that both r0 and r0 ¡ ½v
are in S. Then for any set with size 1=2, Theorem 1 would depend on the “size” of S.
Theorem 2 could similarly extended to any set with size 1=2 if we redeﬁned the criticality to
depend on S. For example if we assume that S is the generalized rectangle, S = fr0 j 8 i : ri=2 ·
r0
i · rig then Theorem 2 would apply with C(S) = mini;r0
¡i N(ri;r0
¡i)=N(ri=2;r0
¡i). A wide variety
of other extensions are also possible.
7 Improved Results for Parallel Networks
In this section we restrict our study to parallel networks. We assume that there are n links labelled
1 to n. As an aside, we note that the parallel network problem has many other interpretations. For
example, one could interpret the choice of a particular link as the choice of a website, where diﬀerent
sites have diﬀerent congestion characteristics. Other examples include choosing a service facility
[Sti92] or even choosing a nightclub [Art94]. The convergence of play to the Nash equilibrium, when
there are two links, has been analyzed in this setting for a wide range of learning rules [Fri96].
Our main tool will be the use of extensions of Markov’s inequality for probability distributions,
if X ¸ 0 then Pr[X ¸ ½E[X]] · 1=½. Consider the random variable Z which takes on the value
dk(x¤




k(1) = 1 so this is well deﬁned.)
We now present a simple proof of Corollary 1 for parallel networks that will form the basis for
our analysis.
Alternate proof of Corollary 1 for parallel networks: Assume that r = 1 and N(1) = 1.
10By assumption Opt(1) = °¡1 which implies that E[Z] = °¡1. By Markov’s lemma Pr(Z ¸
½°¡1) · 1=½. Thus, consider the ﬂow x0(1) where x0
k(1) = x¤
k(1) if dk(x¤
k(1)) < ½°¡1 and 0






k(1)) · ½°¡1. Noting that
P
k x0
k(1) · 1 ¡ 1=½ implies that N(1 ¡ 1=½) · (1 ¡ 1=½)½°¡1. Setting ½ = (1 + ±)=± completes the
proof. 2
We will reﬁne this result for parallel networks using reﬁnements of Markov’s lemma. For exam-
ple, one can prove that for any 1 < ½ < ½0 and a > b such that a + b(1 ¡ ½=½0) = 1, then if X ¸ 0
either Pr[X ¸ ½E[X]] · a=½ or Pr[X ¸ ½0E[X]] · b=½0). (See the appendix for details.) Using
this result we can prove the following extension of Corollary 1.
Corollary 3 For all ± > ±0 2 (0;1] and a > b such that a + b(1 ¡ (1 + 1=±)=(1 + 1=±0)) = 1, if
Γ(r) = ° then either N(r=(1 + ±)) · N(r)a°¡1=± or N(r=(1 + ±0)) · N(r)b°¡1=±0.
We can use this to somewhat improve Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 For any parallel network, r > 0 and Γ(®r) > ° for all ® 2 [1=2;1], then logC(r) ¸
¯° log(2)=e + O(1), where ¯ = 1 + 2e¡1(1 ¡ E¡1) ¼ 1:5.
Proof: This proof parallels that of Theorem 1 but uses Corollary 3 instead of Corollary 1 with
± = e=°, ±0 = e2=°, a = 1=® and b = a2e¡1. The values of a and b have been chosen so that they
give precisely the same bound on the reduction from N(r) to N(r=c) for any c. For example, each
time ± is used in Corollary 3 the value of r is reduced by a factor of (1 + e=°)=a while the value of
N is reduced by at least 1=e, while if ±0 is used then the reduction of r is (1 + e2=°)=b while the
reduction in N is 1=e2. 2
Note that we can use more complex extensions of Markov’s inequality to increase this factor
further. The best we have been able to ﬁnd is:
11Theorem 5 For any parallel network, r > 0 and Γ(®r) > ° for all ® 2 [1=e;1], then logC(r) ¸
1:2° + O(1).
Finally, we note that for the case of a 2 link parallel networks, an important subclass that
applies to many problems arising in networks [Fri97] we get signiﬁcantly stronger results. First the
key lemma.
Lemma 1 For a two link parallel network, if Γ(r) ¸ ° then N(r(1 ¡ °¡1)) · °¡1N(r).
Using this one gets a doubly exponential version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 6 For any 2 link parallel network, r > 0 and Γ(®r) > ° for all ® 2 [1=e;1], then
loglogC(r) ¸ blog(2)=log(1 + e=°)c = °=e + O(1) and thus C(r) = exp[exp[Ω(°)]].
8 Queuing Latencies
Perhaps the most natural latency functions to study are the well-known queuing-delay functions.
The simplest and most common of these is the M/M/1 queue for which the delay is given by
d¹(x) = (¹ ¡ x)¡1, where ¹ is the service rate. It is possible that when restricted to latencies of
this type that selﬁsh behavior might not lead to unbounded losses. We now show that this is not
the case since the losses can be unbounded for a large set of ﬂow rates.
First we note that if a parallel network has k identical links then the Nash ﬂow on each link
will be the same. This is also true for the optimal ﬂow. Thus, s copies of a link with latency d(x)
is eﬀectively the same as a single link with latency d(x=s). In the examples below we will allow
ourselves latencies of the type d¹(x=s) = for any s > 0.
Consider a parallel network with one M/M/1 link with (integral) service rate ¹ >> 1 and
n = ¹ links with service rate 1. Let r = ¹ ¡ 1. Then the Nash equilibrium is ˆ x1 = 0; ˆ x2 = r and
12N(r) = ¹ ¡ 1. One can compute the optimal ﬂow algebraically but the following estimate will be
suﬃcient. Consider the ﬂow where d¹(x2) =
p
¹¡1, then x2 = ¹¡
p
¹ and x1 =
p
¹¡1. The value




¹) + (1 ¡ ¹¡1=2 + ¹¡1)¡1(
p
¹ ¡ 1) =
p
¹ + O(1)
and thus Γ(r) =
p
¹ + O(1). Thus if we choose ¹ suﬃciently large we can construct an example
with arbitrarily large loss.
Combining the above analysis with our earlier example with generically large losses we can
construct a example using only M/M/1 latencies with generically large losses. Thus, the restriction
to M/M/1 latency functions does not alter our main observations.
Note that using the same techniques we can show that for many common delay functions arising
from stochastic queues we can construct a parallel network with arbitrarily large generic losses.
9 Congestion Control
Currently on most data networks the transmission rate is determined by a ﬂow control algorithm.
For example, the ﬂow rate of a TCP connection is controlled by the congestion in the network.
Recently there have been proposals to require that unicast be “TCP-friendly” by setting its ﬂow
rate to be comparable to TCP [FHP+00]. As we now show, such constraints can dramatically
reduce the losses due to selﬁsh routing. For simplicity, we will consider a parallel network with k
links.
Previously we have that each inﬁnitesimal player controls one inﬁnitesimal unit of ﬂow, chooses
a link to send this ﬂow on and receives the latency of that route as the “payoﬀ”. Then the latency
of link k depends on the total mass of players, xk which use that link.
In a model with ﬂow control, the ﬂow (of packets which are not dropped) on a link is a function of
13the mass of players which use that link. We assume that each player repeatedly opens a single TCP
connection to send a ﬁle of k packets. For simplicity, we consider the static form of TCP in which
the rate for a single connection is simply ¸ = we=r where we is the window size for link e and r is the
roundtrip time. We also assume that the roundtrip time is given by the delay formula for an M/M/1
queue with transmission rate ¹e. Then if there are xe open TCP connections r = 1=(¹e ¡ xe¸).
Combining these formulas yields the result that r = (xewe + 1)=¹ and ¸ = w¹=(xewe + 1).
In this setting the latency of the link is clearly not what the agent will be minimizing. It seems
natural to deﬁne the “cost” to an agent to be the time it takes to complete a ﬁle transfer. In this
case the agent will be minimizing the cost ce(xe) = k=¸+r = (k+we)=(we¹e)(xewe+1). Note that
by varying we and ¹e we can construct any aﬃne cost function ce(xe) = ae + bexe with ae;be > 0.
Note that the cost function in this model is the exact counterpart of the latency function in the
previous model. Thus, all of the previous results on selﬁsh routing without ﬂow control apply to
this model when we set the latency to be the cost function.
Thus, we see that the eﬀect of ﬂow control is to “ﬂatten out” the cost/latency function. In this
speciﬁc case, the cost/latency function is linear and thus by a result of Roughgarden and Tardos
[RT00] the loss, for any ﬂow rate and network, due to selﬁsh routing ° · 4=3. Thus, the losses in
a model with ﬂow control are bounded by a small constant and perhaps the losses due to selﬁsh
routing are insigniﬁcant in this setting, when compared to other losses that might arise for other
reasons.
A Appendix: Conditional Markov Bounds
The following lemma is straightforward to prove using the analysis in [Smi95].
Lemma 2 For any 1 < ½0 < ½1 < ¢¢¢ < ½n and x0;x1;:::;xn > 0 such that
Pn
j=0 xj = 1, deﬁne
14inductively aj = xj + aj+1½j=½j+1. Then there exists the following bound:
There exists some j 2 f0;ng such that Pr[X ¸ rhojE[X]] · aj=½j.
From this we can prove the following useful corollary:
Theorem 7 For any 1 < ½0 < ½1 < ¢¢¢ < ½n and a0;a1;:::;an > 0 such that a0 +
Pn
j=0 aj(1 ¡
½j¡1=½j) = 1. Then there exists the following bound:
There exists some j 2 f0;ng such that Pr[X ¸ rhojE[X]] · aj=½j.
For example, one can use this to prove the following interesting bounds:
Corollary 4 i)There exists some j 2 f2;ng such that Pr[X ¸ 2jE[X]] · [2=(n ¡ 1)]=2j.
ii)For any ½ > 1 there exists some ½0 2 [½;¯½ such that Pr[X ¸ ½0E[X]] · [1=(1 + ¯)]=½0.
Proof: Part (ii) is proved most simply by taking the limit of a discrete set of evenly spaced points. 2
Theorem 5 is based on the following extension:
Corollary 5 There exists some p 2 [:5;10] such that Pr[X ¸ °epE[X]] · pe1¡p=(¯0°ep) where
¯0 = 2e1=2 ¡ (23=2)e1=2=e10 ¼ 3:30.
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